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I. Introduction 
 
     Sut Jhally begins his essay “Advertising at the Edge of the Apocalypse” with the following 
alarming claim: “Advertising is the most powerful and sustained system of propaganda in human 
history and its cumulative effects, unless quickly checked, will be responsible for destroying the 
world as we know it.”1 By forging an association between human aspiration and the desire for 
consumable goods, says Jhally, the advertising industry creates an inflated demand for such 
goods that is, at once, far in excess of that needed for human  flourishing and catastrophic to the 
global environment. This association, now driving modern global culture, will destroy the earth 
if left unchallenged.  
     Jhally sees capitalism as the ultimate culprit. In a system that understands wealth as a “vast 
collection of commodities” (Marx, Capital), those who produce such commodities have no other 
choice but to promote excess consumption. Hence the advertising industry emerges as the 
propaganda arm of capitalism, whose job is not so much to inform the public of capitalism’s 
products as to modify society’s basic values in a materialistic direction.  Jhally seems to believe 
that if the advertising industry were to disappear, society’s materialism would go with it: 
“Capitalism has to try really hard to convince us about the value of the commercial vision. In 
some senses consumer capitalism is a house of cards, held together in a fragile way by an 
immense effort, and it could just as soon melt away as hold together. It will depend if there are 
viable alternatives to motivate people to believe in a different future, if there are other ideas as 
pleasurable, as powerful, as fun, as passionate with which people can identify.”2 
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     My paper argues that, though Jhally’s description of the problem is compelling and 
disturbing, his diagnosis fails to reach its heart. Indeed, it is not Marx but Plato who best 
provides the terms needed to understand and respond to the problem Jhally cites. Plato’s critique 
of oratory in the Gorgias  displays striking parallels to Jhally’s depiction of modern advertising. 
Plato’s discussion of the ‘shadowy’ nature of human belief formation (doxa), as presented in his 
divided line theory and allegory of the cave, provides insight into the ways modern advertising 
achieves its end.  In both accounts Plato suggests that the dual immediacies of bodily desire and 
sensory experience collude to cause in us a misapprehension and misvaluation of self and world. 
As a result we confuse the true goods of the soul (e.g., friendship, justice, beauty, etc.) with the 
relatively superficial but more immediate gratifications of the body. A Platonic analysis indicates 
that modern advertising, like the questionable oratory of Plato’s own day, works through a more 
or less deliberate fostering of such shadow-like confusion.   
     Viewed with Platonic eyes, however,  what is needed  is not, as Jhally contends, a new vision 
of the world that is as “pleasurable, powerful, fun, and passionate” as that of advertising, but a 
new pedagogy  targeted at undoing the confusion itself. My paper concludes with some 
suggestions as to what such a pedagogy might look like.      
 
II. Goods and ‘The Good’ 
     In the Republic Plato writes, “Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its 
sake. It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it 
is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs about it that it has about other things, and so it misses the 
benefit, if any, that even those other things may give” (Rep. 505e).3   
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     The goal of philosophy, from the Platonic perspective, is, precisely, the resolution of this 
perplexity. The goal of modern advertising, as Jhally’s work suggests, is precisely the reverse. 
Jhally writes that modern advertising operates through a kind of bait and switch, associating the 
material products it has to offer with more intangible goods we value more. “The advertising 
industry . . . ,” writes Jhally, “has stopped trying to sell us things based on their material qualities 
alone. If we examine the advertising of the end of the nineteenth century and in the first years of 
the twentieth century, we would see that advertising talked a lot about the properties of 
commodities – what they did, how well they did it, etc. But starting in the 1920s, advertising 
shifts to talking about the relationships of objects to the social life of people. It starts to connect 
commodities (the things they have to sell) with the powerful images of a deeply desired social 
life that people say they want.”4    
     That such a practice – magnified in its influence by the modern mass media and in its effects 
by modern technology – would lead to catastrophic results is something Plato might well have 
foreseen.  But its emergence would not have surprised him. The native epistemic condition of 
human beings, which Plato famously likens to that of prisoners trapped in a cave only able to see 
shadows on the wall, is itself such as to foster confusion between material objects and the socio-
spiritual goods (goods of the soul) that both Plato and Jhally regard as basic to human well-
being. Advertising does not create this confusion but promotes and manipulates it for its own 
ends.  
     The solution Plato proposes is education, paideia, by which he means a discipline of rational 
self-examination through which the basic goods of the soul may be distinguished from the 
material objects on which they are projected and with which they become confused. But in order 
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to understand the kind of paideia Plato regarded as necessary we must first examine more 
closely the nature of the perplexity it is designed to overcome. 
 
III. Plato’s Theory of Confusion 
     Plato’s allegory of the cave is an allegory of human confusion. Plato’s cavedwellers are so 
situated as to be able to see only shadows of artifacts that are themselves but ‘copies’ of true 
reality, represented by the world outside the cave. The prisoners confuse the shadows they 
apprehend with reality itself. Given their constraints, writes Plato, “the prisoners would in every 
way believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts.”5  In order to 
interpret the allegory we must come to understand the meaning of the shadows, how they may be 
contrasted with the artifacts that cast them, and how these artifacts may themselves be contrasted 
with unmediated truth, as present only outside the cave.  
     The first thing to note is that Plato’s conception of knowledge is both hierarchical and 
axiological. We understand lower-order truths in the context of higher-order truths, and truth 
itself is disclosive of value. At the apex of this axiological hierarchy is ‘the idea of the good,’ 
represented in the allegory by the sun. Although it is the task of philosophy as a whole to gain a 
substantive understanding of this comprehensive good, it may be formally defined as that which 
satisfies the fundamental longings of the soul. Thus, for Plato, the intellect’s pursuit of truth is  
always interested, it seeks knowledge as a way of achieving its good.
 6
 This interestedness, 
indeed, determines what truth itself means. We know a thing in truth only to the extent that we 
know its true worth, the way in which it either serves or detracts from the satisfaction of the soul. 
Thus, to know what is worthwhile in itself, the good, is necessary for knowing the truth of other 
things.   
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     The Platonic ‘forms’ – represented in the allegory by the objects outside the cave – might best 
be thought of, then, as ideal complexes or structures essential to the fundamental well-being of 
the soul. Among the principle forms of which Plato speaks in this regard are ‘friendship,’ 
‘justice,’ ‘beauty,’ ‘virtue,’ etc., although for Plato every positive reality might be said to have an 
ideal structure, or form, through which some aspect of the good may be realized in a particular 
context.  To understand these forms of the good and to know how they relate to the lives we lead 
is to have wisdom. The achievement of such wisdom is the philosophic quest.  
     Plato’s cave allegory, of course, suggests that human beings in general are cut off from direct 
apprehension of these forms of the good. Entrapped in the twilight world of the cave, the 
prisoners are able to see only shadows of artifacts; artifacts which are themselves but artificial 
replicas – images – of the true goods outside the cave.  
     What do these artifacts represent? Plato gives us two clues which help us to identify them. 
First, he tells us that  the cave as a whole stands for “the visible realm” (Rep. 517b), i.e., the 
sensible world. Next, we are told that the entire allegory is to be “connected” to the immediately 
preceding account of the divided line (Rep. 517b), with respect to which the artifacts would 
clearly correspond to the second division. Taking these two together, we can take these artifacts 
to represent material-sensible objects.
7
  
     But what can Plato mean in likening such objects to artifacts? Plato’s suggestion is that such 
objects have for us a dual meaning. On the one hand, as sensible objects they make an immediate 
sensible impression upon us to which we immediately respond. On the other, as, in some sense, 
artificial images of the goods of soul outside the cave, they serve as symbols, signs, and, perhaps, 
means through which these immaterial goods might more easily be known and actualized in the 
sensory world.
8
  To see the artifacts truly, then, would be to see them, precisely, as artifacts,  that 
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is to say, as artificial images that point beyond themselves to a realm of meaning they signify but 
cannot fully or truly embody.      
     But Plato’s prisoners do not see these artifacts truly, that is, as artifacts, rather they see only 
the shadows cast by the artifacts and erroneously take these shadowy perceptions for truth itself. 
     To make sense of the allegory, then, we must ask ourselves what Plato intends by these 
‘shadows.’  Judging from remarks Plato makes throughout the Republic, and indeed throughout 
his corpus, we can interpret the shadows to represent, at least in part, the material-sensible 
objects of the former level as perceived through the sensual appetites and passions they 
immediately excite. The prisoners take these sensual excitations to be the meaning of these 
sensible things, failing to recognize them as pointing beyond themselves to intangible goods that 
they can, at best, signify. As a result, they compete with one another for access to these things as 
if they were, in themselves, the bases of human fulfillment.
9
 This is the basic ignorance-
confusion of the human condition, from which all folly and vice flow. 
     Plato gives us a classic depiction of just such shadowy ignorance in the Apology, where 
Socrates, the man whom Plato calls elsewhere the ‘most just of his generation,’ is condemned to 
death as a criminal after his failure to favorably sway the passions of his judges. The Athenian 
courthouse, ideally a symbol and vehicle of justice, is viewed and treated by the citizenry as a 
mere staging ground for contests over private interests and passions. The sophists, themselves 
engaged in a shadow of true pedagogy, teach their students the rhetorical skills needed to excel at 
this contest, irrespective of the justice of their cause.  The ‘truth’ of the courthouse, as a place of 
justice, is hopelessly distorted and obscured.  
     But to complete our interpretation of the shadows we must make one addition. We must recall 
that the shadows continue to bear a relationship of meaning – although faint and indistinct – to 
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the immaterial goods, the goods of the soul, outside the cave. They are shadows of images of 
those very goods. Suggested here is that the prisoners do not simply substitute sensual aims for 
the aims of the soul but rather confuse the latter with the former; seeing in sensual gratification, 
and in the material things and circumstances associated with it, the very goods of soul for which 
they still fundamentally, but ignorantly, yearn.
10
 The speech of Diotama in the Symposium 
provides an excellent illustration of this. There sexual eros is viewed as but a ‘shadow’ of the 
loftier erotic yearning for participation in beauty itself. The intensity of the sexual drive, it is 
suggested, is a function of its confusion with this loftier and more fundamental desire, which the 
bare physical act of sex does not satisfy.   
     As a result of such confusion the material world acquires an allure that its mere materiality 
would never afford it.  There is a breach between appearance and reality such that the material 
world comes to seem more enticing and more meaningful than it actually is. The prisoners grasp 
at faint shadows of fulfillment, supposing these shadows to be fulfillment itself. It is this 
overdetermination of meaning, resulting from a superimposition of our immediate material 
inclinations upon our more fundamental, but more remote, immaterial interests, that modern 
advertisers have learned to exploit for their own ends.     
 
IV. Oratory and Advertising 
     Of course Plato composed his allegory of the cave long before the advent of modern 
advertising. It was not advertising images that Plato was alluding to but the images of material 
objects as such. Nevertheless, Plato was well aware that the confusion to which we are natively 
inclined can be magnified or lessened by societal conventions that shape the opinions (doxa) 
governing our everyday perceptions of the world. This is the great danger of the sophistical 
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orators Plato takes issue with in the Gorgias. Such oratory, writes Plato, “guesses at what’s 
pleasant with no consideration for what’s best.”11 
     As Jhally views them, modern advertisers are like latter day orator-sophists. They achieve 
their ends by exploiting the confusion it was Plato’s goal to resolve. “What it [advertising] offers 
us,” writes Jhally, “are images of the real sources of human happiness – family life, romance and 
love, sexuality and pleasure, friendship and sociability, leisure and relaxation, independence and 
control of life. That is why advertising is so powerful; that is what is real about it. The cruel 
illusion of advertising is in the way that it links those qualities to a place that, by definition, 
cannot provide it – the market and the immense collection of commodities. The falsity of 
advertising is not in the appeals it makes (which are very real) but in the answers it provides. We 
want love and friendship and sexuality – and advertising points the way to it through objects.”12  
     Modern day advertising works, not by rationally persuading us that the products it offers will 
provide the gratification we seek – for at the level of rational discernment we know that they will 
not – but by short-circuiting rational discernment altogether.13 Advertisers quite deliberately 
target what Plato calls the ‘appetitive soul,’ eroticizing their products in ways designed to make 
them seem more interesting, alluring, and important than rational reflection would have us 
conclude. The effects of this are twofold. On the one hand, consumer products collectively 
acquire an aura of excitement and magical potency that, of course, we know they do not really 
possess. We are aware of the falsity in which we are nevertheless enmeshed. On the other, 
constant immersion in this world of falsity makes it ever more difficult for us to exercise the 
reflective judgment that would disentangle us from it. The very boundary line between reality 
and unreality fades away.   
     This creates a host of problems. Let us consider just a few.   
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     First, the advertising culture creates a mentality of scarcity even in the midst of unprecedented 
material abundance. It does this by continually evoking a desire for things that cannot satisfy that 
desire. Thus one has the odd experience of feeling constantly empty despite one’s constant 
access to that which the culture tells one should alleviate one’s emptiness. Since, presumably, 
one has everything one could possibly desire, the fault must lie in oneself. We are ‘depressed.’  
      Next, this mentality of scarcity leads to an intensification of restlessness and competiveness, 
as we restlessly compete for access to the goods that falsely promise to resolve our restlessness. 
The problem here is not simply that we can never get enough, but that the very idea of ‘enough’ 
has lost its appeal.  As the theologian and culture critic William Cavanaugh, writes, “In 
consumer society. . .  dissatisfaction and satisfaction have ceased to be opposites. Pleasure 
resides not in having but in wanting. Insofar as an item obtained brings a temporary halt to 
desire, it becomes undesirable. This is why shopping, not buying, captures the spirit of 
consumerism.”14  
     In the consumer culture one does not want to be satisfied. Since what is touted as ‘satisfying’ 
does not actually satisfy, the very thought of being satisfied with it is depressing. This 
realization, that we cannot be satisfied even in supposed satisfaction, produces a cynical 
desperation made tolerable only by the constant distractions the culture itself provides.       
     But Plato would no doubt consider the greatest problem to be the one we have discussed – the 
erosion of axiological discernment fostered by the constant superimposition of fantastical images 
of happiness onto materialistic-individualistic pursuits.  The overall effect is to have us focus our 
lives on the procurement of individual, immediate, and, for the most part, material gratification. 
That we also know, on some level, that this will not satisfy us does not so much alter this focus 
as color it with a tincture of despair.   
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     All of this helps make intractable the problem that Jhally highlights: the rape of the 
environment that material overproduction demands. Jhally’s basic point is that our inability to 
respond to this catastrophe in a level-headed way is a function of the degradation to our capacity 
for rational judgment that the advertising culture spawns. We cannot focus on what is good for 
us because the culture itself is in the constant and deliberate process of blurring our vision of 
what is good. Though reason tells us clearly that global disaster looms, our envelopment in the 
shadows makes us unable to respond. We fiddle, as the earth burns.  
 
V. Paideia 
     While Jhally’s diagnosis of the problem is consistently illuminating, the solutions he advances 
seem to me weak. As noted in the introduction,  Jhally writes that any solution will depend on 
whether there are “viable alternatives [to consumer culture] . . . as pleasurable, as powerful, as 
fun, as passionate with which people can identify.” Plato might well respond that Jhally’s 
invocation of ‘pleasure, passion, and fun’ as the values through which the consumer culture 
might be overcome is itself symptomatic of it.  The goods of the soul that Plato thought 
fundamental – e.g., friendship, self-discipline (sophrosyne), justice, beauty, etc. – though deeply 
gratifying in their own ways, are not such as to elicit the sort of immediate excitation we tend to 
associate with the word ‘fun.’ Where ‘fun’ continues to be heralded as a primary value, the 
pursuit of individualistic, sensual, and egoistic gratifications at the heart of consumerism will 
almost certainly continue unabated.   
     From the Platonic point of view what is needed is not to make the goods of the soul more 
‘fun,’ but more visible. To those who see them clearly, Plato was convinced, their superior worth 
and allure become obvious. The attainment of such intellectual clarity is the specific goal of the 
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philosophical education – paideia – Plato championed. He believed it to be the only way out of 
the cave of human ignorance and folly.  
     In the space remaining I would like to briefly sketch out some essential features of the 
Platonic  paideusis, or system of education, and consider the possibility of its application to our 
modern circumstances.   
 
1. Non-doctrinaire 
     The first thing we might note  is that Platonic education is non-doctrinaire. Its aim is not to 
inculcate a particular worldview but to “turn the soul around” (Rep. 518c) from immersion in the 
sensory to attention to the deeper sources of meaning. Of course, there is an epistemological-
pedagogical doctrine implicit in this aim itself; nevertheless, the purpose is not to teach this 
doctrine but to help students develop their intellectual vision so as to enable them to think for 
themselves.  
     In this respect, at least, the philosophical paideusis accords well with the aims and constraints 
of public education in a liberal democracy. Its goal is not to impart what Rawls has called a 
‘comprehensive doctrine,’ i.e., a particular religious, moral, and/or metaphysical worldview, but 
to provide students with the wherewithal to seriously examine the worldview they possess.    
 
2. Distinction between Technical ‘Know-How’ and Truth 
     Among the first things such an educational program would need to emphasize is the 
distinction between technical knowledge (or know-how) and what Plato would have understood 
by ‘truth’ in the highest sense. This distinction has largely been blurred in the modern era due to 
the great successes of the empirical sciences, but Plato recognized it as crucial.
15
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     Technical knowledge might be defined as knowledge that enables one to predict and control 
events in the phenomenal world. Truth, by contrast, refers to an understanding of the world in its 
axiological significance. A philosophical paideusis would make it clear to students that technical 
mastery, however extensive, can never yield axiological truth. The pursuit of such truth must 
proceed otherwise.  
 
3. Inadequacies of Sensation 
     Next, a Platonic paideusis would engage students in a reflection on the paradoxes and 
inadequacies of sensory experience as a source of reliable knowledge. There are any number of 
ways of showing that sense experience alone provides neither the sources of meaning nor the 
principles of structure essential to adequate cognition.   
     Plato himself believed that reflection on mathematics would have this effect, given that 
numbers and numerical relations are not presented to us through the senses but are nevertheless 
integral to an adequate cognition of the world. The general aim here is to have students begin the 
process of discriminating between that which is immediately given by the senses and cognitive 
apprehension.  
 
V4. Concept Formation 
     Having learned to make this distinction, students would now be prepared to reflect upon the 
nature of cognition itself, through an examination of the nature of concepts (universals) and 
concept-formation. How do concepts differ from sense-data? How do they operate to organize 
our cognitive apprehension of the world? How does such cognitive apprehension determine the 
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presuppositions we bring to experience and the meanings we derive from it?  These are the sorts 
of questions students at this level would take up. 
 
V5. Axiological Discernment 
     Finally, such a program of education would deliberately and systematically engage students in 
a practice of axiological discernment, through having them reflect upon specifically value-laden 
concepts, with respect to both their cultural and ontological bases as well as their individual and 
societal effects. Here we might engage students in a direct examination and critique of cultural 
influences on value-formation, especially the role that advertising and other mass media forces 
play in shaping society’s values. At the same time we would make clear to students the 
enormous significance of valuation and value-systems for the conduct of individual, social, and 
political life.  
 
     My suggestion is that such an educational program, made part of the basic High School 
curriculum, would go some distance in helping students achieve the reflective sophistication 
Plato would have thought necessary to combating the corrosive influences of the advertising 
culture.     
 
VI. Conclusion  
     Again, the aim of the Platonic paideusis is not to inculcate a worldview, but to have students 
learn to reflect intelligently upon the bases of their own and others’ worldviews. The problem, as 
Plato was aware, is not simply that we have the wrong values – that is the symptom – it is that 
we do not know how to adequately reflect upon the values we have. The grave danger of 
14 
 
 
advertising, from this perspective, is not that it tends to make us materialists, but that it tends to 
make us stupid (quite literally, placing us in a ‘stupor’).  Plato’s contention is that materialism 
and egoism follow from this as a matter of course.  
     The solution, thus, is not to promote ‘better’ values through the same questionable means the 
advertisers use to promote consumerism, but to educate people to be able to seriously and 
effectively reflect upon the values they have. Plato believed – and we might call this ‘Platonic 
faith’ – that this in itself would yield ‘better’ values.      
     This, finally, is what Plato seems to have meant in saying that true education does not 
inculcate a system of belief, but ‘turns the soul around’ so as to enable it to discover that system 
of belief most conducive to it’s own true good. Today, in the face of unprecedented global 
challenges and all but unlimited media sway, the need for such a pedagogy seems to me critical 
as never before.    
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